The globalization of State capitalism
Although the context and nature of state capitalism is different from the Imperial era, states remain key sources of foreign investment. They can be classified under four abbreviations: SOEs, SWFs, SOFIs, and SIEs. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are most important. They own or control more than 15,000 foreign affiliates and control more than $2 trillion worth of foreign assets around the world.
2 Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) also play a role with more than $100 billion of foreign investment stock -most of which is in developed countries. Even when investments are made by pure private entities their project finance often hinges, at least in part, on public money.
State-owned financial institutions (SOFIs), a sub-category of SOEs, account for a quarter of total assets in global banking systems and governments own most major pension funds. 3 In addition, government involvement can take place through direct influence on investment activities. An example of such state-influenced enterprises (SIEs) 4 is when the Russian state guides activities of conglomerates owned by Russian oligarchs. In Iran, as well, the Revolutionary Guards has influence on a wide range of companies, 5 and in a country like Pakistan the army is deeply embedded in the country's major companies and banks. 6 To the extent these SIEs invest abroad, they also engage in what can loosely be described as sovereign FDI. Governments thereby support a wide range of foreign investors from around the world, directly or indirectly, actively or passively. Defining the very concept of sovereign FDI itself is bound to be a difficult challenge. 
Sovereign investors as private investors
Although there has been a growing tendency to include language on sovereign investors in investment treaties over the last decade, an OECD survey of more than 
Leave it to the arbitrators?
One of the main justifications for the modern investment arbitration regime is that it can assist with 'de-politicizing' investment disputes. Lowenfeld notes:
[T]he essential feature of investor-[s]tate arbitration, as it has developed since the ICSID Convention ... is that controversies between foreign investors and host states are insulated from political and diplomatic relations between states. In return for agreeing to independent international arbitration, the host state is assured that the state of the investor's nationality (as defined) will not espouse the investor's claim or otherwise intervene in the controversy between an investor and a host state, for instance by denying foreign assistance or attempting to pressure the host state into some kind of settlement. Correspondingly, the state of the investor's nationality is relieved of the pressure of having its relations with the host state disturbed or distorted by a controversy between its national and the host state. ... The paradigm in investor-States disputes, ... is a dispute between the first party (nearly always the investor) as plaintiff, and the second party (nearly always the host state or state agency) as respondent. There is no third party.
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The extent to which this justification for investment arbitration is accurate is unclear, both conceptually (is it meaningful to distinguish politics from law in this way?) 20 Treaty drafters have not given arbitrators much to go by in answering these questions.
The investment chapter in TPP, for instance, follows standard US practise by allowing sovereign investors to file claims against host states but includes no clarification on how arbitrators should draw the public-private distinction in practise. 24 This lack of specificity is contrasted with the 36 page long chapter in the same agreement seeking to promote market-based practises for SOEs and designated monopolies. The latter chapter includes very specific rules governing sovereign entities operating in the Pacific Rim -including a range of exceptions and carveoutswhereas the investment chapter leaves it up arbitrators to determine the core question of whether sovereign investors should be considered private or public for the purpose of investment disputes. The relatively few other investment treaties that mention sovereign investors provide no detailed guidance either.
One can only speculate as to why treaty drafters have not sought greater clarity on this point. One explanation could be that the public-private distinction has yet to be a salient issue in a controversial investment treaty dispute and we know that treaty drafting in the investment regime largely takes place through the rear-view mirror:
23 Charles Clover and Lucy Hornby, "China's Great Game: Road to a new empire." Financial Times, October 12, 2015. 24 Article 9.1 of TPP notes that "investor of a Party means a Party, or a national or an enterprises of a Party, that attempts to make, is making, or has made an investment in the territory of another Party." governments seem more keen on clarifying provisions that came up in past disputes, rather than prepare for disputes of the future. 25 No-matter the explanation, however, the lack of specific treaty language leaves arbitrators with little to go by, except perhaps customary international law on state attribution. Here, the public-private distinction should be made by assessing whether an entity is under the direction or control of the home state or is exercising elements of state authority. 26 These are useful principles but without further guidance they can be more than difficult to follow in practise, and arbitrators therefore have very significant flexibility in where to draw the line between public and private activities.
That could be a risky political choice. This is for two reasons. a Court, in deciding the legal question in legal terms, might in effect be prejudicing or indeed frustrating decisions of policy, which it may not itself be in a position even to understand, other than perhaps marginally. The Court has no expertise or even experience in the … criteria that a political body would expect to apply to this kind of political decision.
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Some disputes arising from the contentious nature of globalized state capitalism could very well fall under this category, in which case it would be unwise to refer them to arbitration practitioners specialised in the worlds of private investment and commerce.
Secondly, before the explosion in investment treaty claims, Paulsson noted that:
[a]rbitration without privity is a delicate mechanism. A single incident of an adventurist arbitrator going beyond the proper scope of his jurisdiction in a sensitive case may be sufficient to generate a backlash. Another option is a government filter similar to those related to taxation in NAFTA:
sovereign investors would have access to investor-state arbitration if neither home or host state vetoes the claim in which case disputes would have to be settled in domestic courts or between the treaty parties themselves. This would act as an effective barrier to sensitive political claims that investment arbitrators may be ill-equipped to decide.
It could also be a useful filter for state parties to distinguish between different types of sovereign investment activities: those considered too contentious to be resolved by investment arbitrators, and those that can reasonably be considered commercial and
should proceed to investor-state arbitration.
Alternatively, and as alluded to above, treaty drafters could be better in guiding arbitrators asked to determine whether a sovereign investor should be allowed to file Again; some may disagree with this act as a matter of policy, 37 but it is difficult to argue that three private lawyers should be allowed to undermine it through investment arbitration. [i]t is both unreasonable and unrealistic to posit an obligation upon an investor to disclose its ultimate objectives in making a particular investment, whether through the purchase of shares or otherwise. Ultimate objectives will […] often be highly speculative and not susceptible to precise articulation, and will be subject to change over time. 41 Even if a clear case can be made that an investment is conducted for non-commercial motives, 42 tribunals may not agree that this in itself is sufficient reason to exclude the investment from treaty coverage. Some investment treaties explicitly cover investments made for non-profit motives, 43 where section III refers to the obligation of all companies to disclose information on matters such as ownership and voting rights, intra-group relations, governance policies, and enterprise objectives. 46 An alternative would be to explicitly target sovereign investors by making reference to the OECD's Guidelines for Corporate
Governance of SOEs 47 as well as the Santiago Principles on the structure and management of SWFs. 48 Investment treaty language inspired by these agreements would send a clear signal that regulation based on internationally recognised standards on corporate governance should be part of the legitimate expectations of sovereign investors. In addition, the SOE chapter in TPP also include significant provisions on transparency and commercially oriented management practises that could serve as useful inspiration.
Concluding thoughts
Responding to sovereign investors in treaty drafting is going to be a challenge. The pure logistics of the exercise can seem daunting. One obvious question is what to do about the thousands of existing treaties in place. Re-negotiation is often costly, so past treaties would probably have to be addressed with binding interpretative statements. 49 This could be done jointly among two or more treaty partners -as the NAFTA parties have done on occasion -or plurilaterally, for instance in the context of UNCTAD or UNCITRAL. Even that is going to be an uphill battle, however, as striking the proper balance between legitimate policy concerns and the legitimate rights of many sovereign investors is bound to be delicate. And some of the options mentioned above arguably involve actual amendments rather than interpretation.
Even so, policy-makers and other stakeholders in the investment regime would be well advised to query whether arbitrators should be given such considerable lee-way in resolving what could be highly politically charged disputes surrounding sovereign investment. Ultimately, it comes down to a question of trust in the arbitration practitioners themselves, which -in recent years -has been questioned in a growing
